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Abstract
Two approaches to emissions trading are cap-and-trade, in which
an aggregate cap on emissions is distributed in the form of allowance
permits, and baseline-and-credit, in which ﬁrms earn emission reduc-
tion credits for emissions below their baselines. Theoretical consid-
erations suggest the long-run equilibria of the two plans will diﬀer
if baselines are proportional to output, because a variable baseline is
equivalent to an output subsidy. As a progressive step towards testing
the full long-run model, this paper reports on a laboratory experiment
designed to test the prediction under ﬁxed emission rates and variable
output capacity. A computerized environment has been created in
which subjects representing ﬁrms choose output capacities under ﬁxed
emission technology and participate in markets for emission rights and
for output. Demand for output is simulated. All decisions are tracked
through a double-entry bookkeeping system. Our evidence supports
the theoretical prediction that aggregate output and emissions are in-
eﬃciently high under a baseline-and-credit trading plan compared to
a corresponding cap-and-trade plan.
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11 Introduction
Emissions trading is now well established as a method of regulating emis-
sions of uniformly mixed pollutants. The classic analysis assumes that the
regulatory authority sets an aggregate cap on emissions from a set of sources
and then divides the cap into a number of tradable permits (frequently called
allowances), each of which authorizes the discharge of a unit quantity of emis-
sions. Although the allowances could be sold at auction to raise revenue, the
most frequently discussed plans assume that the permits will be distributed
to the regulated ﬁrms on some ad hoc basis. Firms then trade the allowances,
establishing a market price. In equilibrium, individual ﬁrms choose emissions
such that the marginal cost of abating pollution equals the allowance price.
They redeem allowances equal to the emissions discharged, selling or banking
the remainder. If emissions exceed the initial distribution of allowances the
ﬁrm must purchase allowances to cover the excess. Such plans are generally
known as cap-and-trade plans. A good example is the U.S. EPA’s sulphur
dioxide auction.
Many ﬁeld implementations of emissions trading take a diﬀerent ap-
proach. An example is the clean development mechanism proposed under
the Kyoto Protocol. In these baseline-and-credit plans there is no explicit
cap on aggregate emissions. Instead, each ﬁrm has the right to emit a cer-
tain baseline level of emissions. This baseline may be derived from historical
emissions or from a performance standard that speciﬁes the permitted ratio
of emissions to output. Firms create emission reduction credits by emit-
ting fewer than their baseline emissions. These credits may be banked or
sold to ﬁrms who exceed their baselines. The eﬀect is to limit aggregate
2emissions to an implicit cap equal to the sum of the individual baselines.
Typical baseline-and-credit plans also diﬀer from classic cap-and-trade in a
number of institutional details. For example, credits are often computed on
a project-by-project basis rather than on the basis of enterprise-wide emis-
sions. They must be certiﬁed and registered before they can be traded and
there are generally restrictions that credits cannot be registered until the
emission reductions have actually occurred.
Baseline-and-credit plans are theoretically equivalent to a cap-and-trade
plan if the cap implicit in the baseline-and-credit plan is ﬁxed and numerically
equal to the ﬁxed cap in a cap-and-trade plan. In many cases, however, the
baseline is computed by multiplying a measure of ﬁrm scale (energy input
or product output) by a performance standard specifying a required ratio of
emissions to input or output.1 In this case, the implicit cap on aggregate
emissions varies with the level of aggregate output. Fischer (2001, 2003)
refers to such plans as tradable performance standards.
The variable baseline in a baseline-and-credit plan introduces a critical
diﬀerence in long-run performance compared to cap-and-trade with the same
implied performance standard.2 Speciﬁcally, the variable baseline acts as a
subsidy on output. Firms receiving this subsidy will tend to expand their
capacity to produce output. This introduces two potential ineﬃciencies. If
the performance standard remains the same in both plans, the baseline-and-
credit plan will exhibit higher output, emissions, and external costs. If, in-
stead, the performance standard under baseline-and-credit is tightened so as
1This ratio is generally called the emission intensity.
2A cap-and-trade plan with aggregate cap on emissions may be said to imply a per-
formance standard of rs = E/Q where E and Q are respectively aggregate emissions and
output in long run equilibrium.
3to meet the aggregate emissions speciﬁed under cap-and-trade, then industry
costs will increase due to unnecessarily tight restrictions on emitting ﬁrms
(Muller 1999; Dewees 2001; Fischer, 2001, 2003). It should be noted that this
reasoning presumes that ﬁrms are adjusting to pollution regulation on two
margins: the emission intensity of output and the level of output itself. More-
over the reasoning is essentially long-run in that output is changed by ﬁrms’
investing or divesting themselves of productive capacity and equilibrium is
computed by imposing a zero-proﬁt restriction on ﬁrms in the market.
Currently, both cap-and-trade and baseline-and-credit plans are being
implemented at similar rates at the international level (Hasselknippe 2003).
However, the predictions on the relative performance of baseline-and-credit
versus cap-and-trade have not been tested in the laboratory. Thus far, exper-
iments have been fruitful in shaping cap-and-trade public policy (Cason 1995;
Cason and Plott 1996), but as of yet no baseline-and-credit laboratory stud-
ies have been published. Laboratory implementation of baseline-and-credit
trading would serve several goals: it would verify that market processes are
suﬃcient to drive agents to competitive equilibrium, demonstrate the con-
trast between baseline-and-credit and cap-and-trade to policy makers, and
possibly create a vehicle for training policy-makers and practitioners in the
nature of alternative emission trading plans.
We have undertaken a long-term research project to compare the prop-
erties of baseline-and-credit and cap-and-trade plans in the lab. In previous
work (Buckley, Muller, and Mestelman 2003) we have developed a tractable
model with constant returns to scale in production and multiple ﬁrm types.
We have implemented a computerized lab environment with explicit capac-
4ity and emission intensity decision, fully speciﬁed markets for emission rights
and output, and a complete accounting framework. We have demonstrated
that predicted results hold in simulated markets with robot traders adjust-
ing on both the output and emissions intensity margins. However, market
instability occurs when capacity is freely adjustable, so we have implemented
work with human subjects slowly, examining the emissions intensity margin
and the output market margin one at a time.
Buckley (2004) reports on six sessions comparing baseline-and-credit with
cap-and-trade when ﬁrm capacities are ﬁxed and ﬁrm adjustment is limited to
emission intensity. The investigation seeks to conﬁrm the prediction that the
outcome of the two approaches would be the same when the output subsidy
inherent to the baseline-and-credit plan can not possibly lead to productive
expansion. Any deviation from parallel results could be then laid to the in-
stitutional diﬀerences between the two plans rather than the implied subsidy
on output and emissions. The study conﬁrms that the overall predictions on
emissions hold. Eﬃciency in the market was improved, although only about
one-half the available gains from trade were realized. However there were
some deviations from the benchmark values computed under the assumption
of perfectly competitive equilibrium. Emission permit prices were higher un-
der baseline-and-credit trading and inventories of permits were irrationally
high in both treatments.
In this paper we investigate the complementary problem of adjustment
on the capacity margin. That is, we hold emission intensity constant at the
optimal level for each type of ﬁrm and allow ﬁrms to increase or reduce their
productive capacity each decision period. We have two objectives. First we
5wish to see whether market forces are suﬃciently strong as to generate and
maintain a competitive equilibrium. Secondly, we are particularly interested
in demonstrating that the baseline-and-credit policy leads to higher emissions
and output than occur under cap-and-trade.
2 Methods
We ran six laboratory sessions (three cap-and-trade and three baseline-and-
credit), each involving 8 subjects, in September and October of 2004. All
subjects had completed an introductory course in economics. Subjects were
recruited from the general population of undergraduates at McMaster Uni-
versity. Sessions lasted approximately three hours. For the ﬁrst hour and
a half, students received instruction and participated in 4 training periods
using an alternate set of parameters. This training period was rewarded by a
ﬂat fee of $10. Subjects then took a short break and returned to participate
in 10 paid rounds using the parameters reported here. After 10 rounds they
were informed of their results and paid privately in cash. Subjects earned
between $18.75 and $53.25 with a mean of $38.91, including the training
fee. The software implementation of the environment detailed below was
programmed at McMaster University using Borland’s Delphi programming
environment and the MySQL open source database.3
Subjects were told that they represented ﬁrms which create emissions
while producing output and selling it on a simulated market. We chose
not to present the experiment in neutral terms, because we believed that
3See Appendix A and B posted at http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/econ/mceel/ for the
laboratory instructions and screenshots of the computerized environment, respectively.
6Figure 1: Firm Cost Curves
the explicit emissions trading environment would help subjects understand
the nature of the decisions they were making. There were four types of
ﬁrms distinguished by emission intensity: two, four, six and eight emission
units per unit of output for Firm Types A, B, C and D respectively. There
were two subjects of each type. Each ﬁrm was initially given four units of
productive capacity, k. Output could be produced at zero marginal cost up
to the ﬁxed capacity. The unit cost of capacity varied from $32 per unit
for the dirtiest ﬁrms (Type D) to $128 per unit for the cleanest ﬁrms (Type
A). Each ﬁrm created external costs proportional to its emissions, although
the instructions did not explicitly inform subjects of this. The marginal
damage of emissions (not provided to the subjects) was assumed constant
at $16 per unit of emissions. These parameters were chosen to equate the
7Figure 2: Marginal Social Cost (and Long-run Average Cost) by Firm Type
marginal social cost (MSC) of each ﬁrm so that all could be present in ﬁnal
equilibrium.4 Figure 1 illustrates the short- and long-run cost curves for a
typical ﬁrm and Figure 2 illustrates how the marginal social cost is equated
across all ﬁrm types when the marginal damage of emissions is equal to $16.
There were two treatments: Cap-and-Trade and Baseline-and-Credit. In
both treatments subjects were started oﬀ at the cap-and-trade equilibrium,
which was chosen to coincide with the social optimum. In the cap-and-trade
treatment 160 permits were distributed each period and aggregate production
capacity began at 32 units of output. This implies an average emission
4Marginal social cost equals unit capacity cost plus the external costs created by each
unit of output. For our parameters MSC equals 160 for all four ﬁrm types.
8intensity of ﬁve at the social optimum. We expect the system to remain stable
at the equilibrium point. In the baseline-and-credit treatment we imposed
a tradable performance standard of 5, equivalent to the average emission
intensity in the cap-and-trade treatment. In this treatment we expect the
output and emissions to increase due to the inherent subsidy to output.
The treatments diﬀered slightly in the sequence of decisions. A ﬂowchart
is provided as Figure 3. In the cap-and-trade treatment subjects begin with
capacity and allowance holdings determined in the previous period. They re-
ceive an endowment of allowances. Their ﬁrst action is to trade allowances in
a multiple-unit uniform-price sealed bid-ask auction (call market). Subjects
were permitted to place up to three bids for additional permits. Each bid was
accompanied by a speciﬁed number of units. Subjects were also allowed to
place up to three asks: each speciﬁed a number of units the subject was will-
ing to sell at a speciﬁed price. This action required subjects to estimate the
price they are willing to pay for additional permits and the price at which
they are willing to sell their permits. They were provided with extensive
on-screen help to aid them in this decision. Once all bids and asks were sub-
mitted, the allowance market cleared, determining a price of permits and a
quantity bought or sold for each subject. Each subject was then required to
produce and oﬀer for sale as much output as he could, given his capacity and
permit holdings. This amount was computed and submitted to the output
market automatically. Demand for output was represented by an exogenous
demand function with known intercept and slope. The output market then
cleared, determining a common output price and an individual quantity sold
and revenue earned for each subject. After reviewing their ﬁnancial report
9Figure 3: Sequence of Events in a Typical Period
10for the period, subjects decide whether to increase or decrease capacity by
one unit.
The baseline-and-credit sequence was identical to cap-and-trade except
that subjects do not receive any emission permits before the credit market
opens. Consequently, they can only trade credits which were produced in
previous periods. The quantity of credits created in the current period is
determined by the ﬁrm’s emission intensity and its quantity of output sold,
and so were credited after output for the current period was determined.
3 Parameterization and Benchmarks
In this section we derive benchmark equilibria for the two treatments under
the assumption of perfect competition. We ﬁrst introduce some notation and
describe the general model which allows adjustment on both the emission
intensity and output margins. Secondly we report on the parameterization
of the model for this experiment, and ﬁnally present the benchmarks.
3.1 Theory
Consider an industry with N ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm i ∈ [1,...,N] produces qi units
of output at an emission rate of ri =
ei
qi, where ei is quantity of emissions.
Industry output is Q =
PN




i=1 riqi. Environmental damages are assumed to be a positive and weakly
convex function of total emissions: D = D(E), D0(E) > 0 and D00(E) ≥ 0.
Willingness-to-pay for the output is a weakly concave function of aggregate
output, WTP =
R Q
0 P(z)dz, where P = P(Q) is an inverse demand curve
with positive ordinate (P(0) > 0) and negative slope (P 0(Q) < 0). The
11private cost of production is a linear homogenous function of output and
emissions: Ci = Ci(qi,ei) = qiCi(1,ri). Unit cost Ci(1,ri) can be separated
into unit capacity cost ci(ri), which is a positive and declining function of the
emission rate with ci(ri) > 0 and c0
i(ri) ≤ 0, and unit variable cost wi, which is
a constant function of output. Consequently, total cost is Ci = ci(ri)qi+wiqi.
Note that the marginal cost of output is ci(ri)+wi and the marginal cost of





An omnipotent social planner would choose an output and emission rate
for each ﬁrm such that it would maximize total surplus, S. The social plan-







































i) ∀i ∈ N, (3)
where an asterisk denotes optimal values and it is assumed that qi
∗ > 0 for
all i.
The eﬃcient abatement condition (2) requires that ﬁrms choose emission
intensities such that the marginal abatement cost −c0
i equals the marginal
damage caused by emissions. The eﬃcient output condition (3) ensures that
output is surplus-maximizing by requiring each ﬁrm’s marginal social cost
12(the right hand side of (3)) equal the marginal willingness to pay for output
(the left hand side of (3)). Note that condition (3) determines only the
aggregate level of output. Any combination of qi
∗ such that the qi
∗s sum to
Q∗ and the ri
∗qi
∗s sum to E∗ satisﬁes the eﬃcient output condition.5
In the present experiment we suppress adjustment on the emission in-
tensity margin by setting each ﬁrm’s emission intensity to its optimal value
r∗
i. Condition (2) vanishes and we are left with condition (3). Because the
emissions intensities for each type of ﬁrm, ri, are ﬁxed, ﬁrms cannot inde-





i), there will be a set of ﬁrm types with least
marginal social cost. This set may contain more than one ﬁrm type, because
two ﬁrm types can have identical marginal social cost if the reduced social
damage generated by the clean ﬁrm type is exactly oﬀset by an increase in
private cost.
The social optimum can be supported as a competitive equilibrium under
cap-and-trade regulation. The regulator distributes allowances Ai to each
ﬁrm so that the sum of allowances granted equals the optimal level of emis-
sions, that is,
PN
i=1 Ai = E∗. Letting Pc denote the price of permits under





i = P(Q)qi − ci(ri
∗)qi − wiqi − Pc(ri
∗qi − Ai). (4)
The ﬁrst order condition for an interior maximum is
P(Q
c) = ci(ri
∗) + wi + ri
∗Pc. (5)
5This feature of the model is a direct result of the constant marginal cost of output
assumption. Unit cost, ci(ri
∗), is a function of emission rate but not output. If this
assumption were relaxed, condition (3) would imply a ﬁrm speciﬁc output level but would
result in a more complicated laboratory environment.
13Equation (5) requires that each ﬁrm earn zero marginal proﬁt, and identiﬁes





i) by Pc and Q∗
i by Qc
i, a solution to the surplus maximization
problem is a competitive equilibrium and vice versa.
Under a baseline-and-credit plan, the regulator sets an industry-wide per-
formance standard, rs. Firm i’s demand for credits is (ri
∗ − rs)qi. Negative
values denote a supply of credits. If the price of credits is Pb, then ﬁrm i’s





i = P(Q)qi − ci(ri
∗)qi − wiqi − Pbqi(ri
∗ − r
s) (6)
The ﬁrst order condition for an interior maximum is
P(Q
b) = ci(ri
∗) + wi + ri
∗Pb − r
sPb. (7)
Equation (7) is the zero marginal proﬁt condition which determines Qb. Let
us assume that the regulator sets the emission rate standard equal to the av-





Comparing the baseline-and-credit condition (7) to the cap-and-trade con-
dition (5), we immediately see that the latter diﬀers from the former only
in the last term, −rsPb, which acts as an output subsidy to the ﬁrm. Con-
sequently, marginal private cost to the ﬁrm is less than the marginal social
cost and the corresponding output, Qb, will be higher than under cap-and-
trade. Since the equilibrium of both trading plans involve the same average
6As mentioned in section 1, we will ﬁnd that setting the performance standard equal
to the optimal average emission rate will result in quantities of emissions and output that
are ineﬃciently high. We could set a stricter standard so that quantities of output and
emissions are optimal but then ﬁrm costs will be ineﬃciently high. Considering that both
methods yield ineﬃciency we choose to focus on the case comparing cap-and-trade with
a baseline-and-credit system with a performance standard equal to the average emission
rate from the optimal scenario.
14Table 1: Cost Parameters
Unit Fixed Fixed B&C
Cost Emission Performance Initial
Firm Type ci(ri
∗) Rate Endowment Standard Credits
A 128 2 20 5 12
B 96 4 20 5 4
C 64 6 20 5 0
D 32 8 20 5 0
Table 2: Variable Capacity Predictions
Price of
Trading Allowances Output Aggregate Aggregate Active
Institution or Credits Price Output Emissions Firm Types
B&C 16 80 48 240 A,B,C,D
C&T 16 160 32 160 A,B,C,D
Note: B&C is Baseline-and-Credit and C&T is Cap-and-Trade.
emission ratio, this higher level of output necessarily implies that aggregate
emissions will be higher than optimal under baseline-and-credit regulation.
3.2 Parameterization
Table 1 presents ﬁrm-speciﬁc parameters used in the sessions reported in
this paper. Table 2 summarizes the associated equilibrium predictions under
the alternative emission trading mechanisms. It is useful to illustrate the
equilibria diagrammatically.
Figure 4 illustrates the cap-and-trade equilibrium when only type A and D
ﬁrms are in the market. The dirty ﬁrms have long-run average costs (LAC)
15Figure 4: Cap-and-Trade Equilibrium
of 32 and create damages of rDMD = 8 × 16 = 128 per unit of output.
Marginal social cost is 160. Firm type A has a higher unit capacity cost at
$128 but lower damages of rAMD = 2×16 = 32 per unit of output, yielding
the same marginal social cost. Optimal output Q∗
C = 32 is determined by the
intersection of the demand curve and marginal social cost. At the optimal
output, type A ﬁrms earn 160 − 128 = 32 in rent per unit of output, or
32/2 = 16 per unit of emissions. Type D ﬁrms earn 160 − 32 = 128 in rent
per unit output, or 128/8 = 16 per unit of emissions. Both types of ﬁrms are
willing to pay $16 per permit. Under cap-and-trade, the regulatory authority
allocates 160 allowances and the allowance market clears at $16 per permit.
Long-run average cost is now $160 for each ﬁrm type. Equilibrium at a
price of $160 implies output of 32 units, and an average emission intensity
16Figure 5: Baseline-and-Credit Equilibrium
of 5. The only way to achieve an average emission intensity of 5 with type
A (rA = 2) and D (rD = 8) ﬁrms is to have equal output capacity of each
ﬁrm type. This equilibrium implies the presence of 16 units of capacity from
type A and 16 units of capacity of type D in the market.
Figure 5 shows the equivalent baseline-and-credit equilibrium. The per-
formance standard is rs = 5 units of emissions per unit of output. Restricting
attention to type A and D ﬁrms, we see this implies that there must be equal
capacity of each ﬁrm type. The eﬀect of baseline-and-credit trading is to
equate the LAC of both ﬁrm types. Given equal capacity shares, average
LAC = (128 + 32)/2 = 80. This determines the ineﬃcient equilibrium out-
put of 48 units, 24 from each ﬁrm type. At this point, type D ﬁrms must
buy rD − rs = 3 credits per unit of output and they are willing to pay
17(80−32)/3 = 16 per credit. Type A ﬁrms create rs−rA = 3 credits per unit
of output. They must receive at least (128 − 80)/3 = 16 per credit to earn
non-negative proﬁts under baseline-and-credit. Since there is equal capacity
of type A and D ﬁrms (24 units for each type), the supply of credits equals
demand for credits at a price of $16.
3.3 Eﬃciency
We compute the eﬃciency of baseline-and-credit and cap-and-trade equi-
libria relative to the maximum surplus available. The social surplus is
equal to the sum of consumers’ surplus and producers’ surplus less any
environmental damage. In computing the environmental damages we as-
sume constant marginal damages of $16 per unit of emissions. From Figure
4 it is clear that under cap-and-trade consumers’ surplus in equilibrium is
0.5(320 − 160)(32) = $2560. Producers’ Surplus is (160 − 80)(32) = $2560,
the same amount. External damages are equal to total emissions multiplied
by the marginal damage, 160 × 16 = 2560. Note that this exactly oﬀsets
the producers’ surplus, so that total social surplus is equal to the consumer
surplus of $2560. Because the emissions cap was set to the socially optimal
level of 160 units of emissions, the cap-and-trade surplus values are optimal.
Using Figure 5, the corresponding consumers’ surplus, producers’ surplus, ex-
ternal damages and total social surplus under baseline-and-credit are $5760,
$0, $3840 and $1920, respectively.





It is convenient to decompose eﬃciency into components associated with
18Table 3: Equilibrium Surplus and Eﬃciency
Components of Eﬃciency
Consumer Producer Environmental
Eﬃciency Surplus Surplus Damages
= + + -
Cap-and-Trade Equilibrium:
C&T Surplus $2560 $2560 $2560 $2560
Eﬃciency Index 100% 100% 100% 100%
Baseline-and-Credit Equilibrium:
B&C Surplus $1920 $5760 $0 $3840
Eﬃciency Index 75% 225% 0% 150%
Note: B&C is Baseline-and-Credit and C&T is Cap-and-Trade.
consumer surplus, producer surplus and external costs. Thus the consumer
surplus component of the eﬃciency index is




Table 3 reports the equilibrium values for total surplus and its components
under the two treatments.
4 Results
Figures 6 to 11 provide an overview of the data. We have three independent
series in each treatment. The ﬁgures show the range and mean of observa-
tions for each period. Many series show a distinct time trend. Moreover,
the fact that there was no payoﬀ to subjects’ inventory of permits held at
the end of the session may have induced an end-game eﬀect in Period 10.
19Table 4: Mean Values over Period 6 to 9 by Treatment
Output Aggregate Permit Market Permit
Capacity* Volume* Emissions* Price Volume Inventories*
Cap-and-Trade:
Session 1 36.50 33.50 159.50 14.75 30.75 17.50
Session 2 34.50 34.25 157.50 7.00 31.25 69.50
Session 3 38.75 30.00 163.00 23.25 46.75 10.50
Treatment Mean 36.58 32.58 160.00 15.00 36.25 32.50
Prediction 32.00 32.00b 160.00b 16.00 32.00b 0.00b
Baseline-and-Credit:
Session 4 48.25 47.00 212.00 11.50 46.00 106.25
Session 5 51.00 49.75 218.00 10.75 45.50 142.50
Session 6 45.25 45.25 217.50 6.50 50.50 119.00
Treatment Mean 48.17 47.33 215.83 9.58 47.33 122.58
Prediction 48.00 48.00c 240.00cb 16.00 48.00c 0.00b
* Treatment eﬀect is signiﬁcant using a t-test and a Mann-Whitney
U-test at a 5% critical level.
c The cap-and-trade treatment is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the prediction
using a t-test at the 5% level.
b The baseline-and-credit treatment is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the prediction
using a t-test at the 5% level.
Accordingly we drop Periods 1 through 5 and 10 in summarizing the re-
sults numerically and report mean values for Periods 6 through 9 in Table 4.
We test for treatment eﬀects using parametric (F-test) and non-parametric
methods. However these tests have extremely limited power, even adopting
a critical level of 10%, so they should not be taken too seriously.7
7With a critical level of 10% there is about a 45% chance of detecting a true diﬀerence
in means of 1.5 standard deviations. We would need a critical level of 25% to get a 70%
chance of detecting this large a diﬀerence in means (two-tailed tests, common variance).
20Figure 6: Capacity
4.1 Capacity, Output and Emissions
Consider ﬁrst the key predictions on capacity, output and emissions. Figure 6
shows the evolution of capacity. Under baseline-and-credit trading, capacity
rises steadily to reach the predicted level of 48 by period 7. Under cap-and-
trade capacity stabilizes quickly between 36 and 40, signiﬁcantly above the
benchmark of 32. The treatment eﬀect is strongly signiﬁcant. Figure 7 shows
a similar pattern for output, except that under cap-and-trade output exceeds
the benchmark level of 32 by only a small amount. This suggests pervasive
underutilization of capacity due to inability to acquire permits. Emissions
(Figure 8) follow the same pattern as output. Despite the general
21Figure 7: Output Volume
Figure 8: Aggregate Emissions
22Figure 9: Eﬃciency
resemblance to the benchmarks, both treatments deviate signiﬁcantly
from their own benchmark equilibria. Nevertheless the treatment eﬀect (cap-
and-trade vs. baseline-and-credit) is strongly signiﬁcant. In total, these ob-
servations conform well to the underlying theory.
These results imply that the eﬃciency losses from baseline-and-credit
trading will be similar to those predicted by theory. Figure 9 reports the
evolution of eﬃciency over the ten periods. Table 5 reports the numerical
results. Eﬃciency was highly variable across sessions. Two of the cap-and-
trade sessions attained close to 100% eﬃciency, while the third achieved only
70%. Mean eﬃciency in the three cap-and-trade sessions was almost exactly
the predicted level of 75%. Due to the wide variation the diﬀerence in means
23Table 5: Mean Eﬃciency over Periods 6 to 9
Components of Eﬃciency
Consumer Producer Environmental
Eﬃciency Surplus* Surplus* Damages*
= + + -
Cap-and-Trade:
Session 1 95% 109% 85% 99%
Session 2 99% 115% 82% 98%
Session 3 70% 88% 83% 101%
Treatment Mean 88% 104% 83% 100%
C&T Equilibrium 100% 100% 100% 100%
Baseline-and-Credit:
Session 4 75% 215% -8% 132%
Session 5 67% 243% -39% 136%
Session 6 83% 199% 19% 135%
Treatment Mean 75% 219% -9% 134%b
B&C Equilibrium 75% 225% 0% 150%
* Treatment eﬀect is signiﬁcant using a t-test and a Mann-Whitney U-test
at a 5% critical level.
b The baseline-and-credit treatment is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the prediction
using a t-test at the 5% level.
was not signiﬁcant. Treatment eﬀects were signiﬁcant for each of the three
components of surplus, however. Under cap-and-trade consumer surplus and
damage were close to their benchmark values, while producer surplus was
signiﬁcantly lower, suggesting that costs were not being minimized. Under
baseline-and-credit trading consumer and producer surplus were close to the
benchmarks while emission damage was less than expected, although still
higher than in the cap-and-trade treatment.
24Figure 10: Permit Trading Prices
4.2 Credit and Allowance Markets
The relatively promising results discussed above were obtained despite some
rather strange behaviour in the markets for credits and allowances. Figure
10 shows dramatic diﬀerences in permit prices across treatments. In cap-
and-trade permit prices are consistently very close to the benchmark and
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from it. In baseline-and-credit, credit prices start
very high, then fall rapidly to below equilibrium levels. However the two
series are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in periods 6 through 9. The high early
prices and rapid decline of permit prices under baseline-and-credit is probably
due to bidding errors in the early periods of the session. A similar pattern
was observed in Buckley (2004), leading to the supposition that it is an
institutional factor associated with baseline-and-credit plans that is driving
25Figure 11: Aggregate Inventory
the diﬀerences. One such factor is the requirement that credits be generated
before being oﬀered for sale.
One quite dramatic diﬀerence between baseline-and-credit and cap-and-
trade plans lies in the behaviour of permit inventories, as illustrated in Figure
11. In the present experiment, any inventory of permits at the end of the
experiment is irrational. Both treatments exhibit signiﬁcant inventory build-
ups, but while the cap-and-trade inventories stabilize below 50 baseline-and-
credit inventories climb steadily. These diﬀerences are driven by the increased
supply of credits generated by expanded output under the ﬁxed performance
standard of baseline-and-credit regulation. The supply of permits is ﬁxed
under cap-and-trade regulation.
265 Discussion and Conclusions
Theory predicts higher aggregate output and emission under baseline-and-
credit than under cap-and-trade when the former imposes a performance
standard consistent with the cap under the latter plan. This is because a
performance standard acts as a subsidy on output. The question remained,
however, whether the theoretical predictions regarding the two mechanisms
would hold in real markets. This paper reports results on controlled labo-
ratory sessions in an environment involving ﬁxed emission technologies and
variable output capacities.
Results from the experimental sessions reported here support the theory.
Using graphical and tabular data, we have conﬁrmed that, while cap-and-
trade emission and output levels stay close to their predicted equilibrium
values, emissions and output soar and converge to their predicted higher
levels under baseline-and-credit. Despite diﬀerences in early permit trad-
ing prices under the two plans, the results strongly support the theoretical
predictions.
One caveat, however, is that it appears that baseline-and-credit regulation
is susceptible to higher levels of permit inventories than cap-and-trade. Even
though permits inventories are predicted to be zero in the baseline-and-credit
equilibrium evidence shows that permits are accumulated in inventory over
the entire experiment. This behaviour might be caused by the relatively
more complex framing of the baseline-and-credit institution in addition to
the variable permit supply inherent to baseline-and-credit regulation.
An experimental environment has now been designed and tested. This
paper reports sessions involving ﬁxed emission rate and variable capacity
27while Buckley (2004) provides results from sessions assuming ﬁxed output
capacity and variable emission rates. With the theoretical framework and
corresponding experimental environment in place, future work can now assess
the long-run theoretical prediction of higher output and emissions under
baseline-and-credit trading in a full model in which ﬁrms choose emission
rates and output capacities.
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